INTRODUCTION
For a number of years we have been conducting controlled human-subject experiments in distributed social computation in networks with only limited and local communication. These experiments cast a number of traditional computational, economic and sociological problems (including graph coloring, consensus, independent set, networked bargaining, biased voting and network formation) as games of strategic interaction in which subjects have financial incentives to collectively "compute" global solutions. I will overview and summarize the many behavioral findings from this line of experimentation. I will give particular emphasis to the novel data the experiments have generated, and the analyses this data has permitted, including quantitative studies of subject "personality" traits such as stubbornness, altruism, and patience, and whether those traits seem helpful or harmful to individual and collective performance. His research interests include topics in machine learning, algorithmic game theory, social networks, computational finance, and artificial intelligence. He often examines problems in these areas using methods and models from theoretical computer science and related disciplines. While the majority of his work is mathematical in nature, he has also participated in a variety of empirical and experimental projects, including applications of machine learning to finance, spoken dialogue systems, and other areas. Most recently, he has been conducting human-subject experiments on strategic and economic interaction in social networks.
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